Now is Our Time: Ask Barack for a Just Foreign Policy
Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, November 7, 2008

I’m guessing that a lot of you, like me, received a lot of email from the Obama campaign over the last many months, urging your support. Many of you, like me, responded. You gave money, made phone calls, knocked on doors.

Now it’s time to write back. The policy window is open, as the political scientists say. During his campaign, President-Elect Obama promised to repair relations between the United States and the rest of the world. Not only that, but he promised to do specific things, many of which could be quickly and easily accomplished. Right now policies are being set and senior officials chosen for the new Administration. Early input counts more: “it’s always too early until it’s too late,” as they say in Washington. Now is the time to ask Barack to fulfill his promises to reform U.S. foreign policy.

http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/involved/askBarack.html

Obama promised that he would end the war in Iraq and withdraw U.S. troops. There is no obstacle to doing so besides the unfulfilled imperial fantasies of the neoconservatives. The Iraqi government itself is demanding a firm timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Obama promised to talk to Iran without pre-conditions. There is no reasons that diplomatic contacts should not begin immediately. The Bush Administration itself has proposed to open an “interests section” - low-level diplomatic representation - in Iran. This would be a good first step. Obama should publicly encourage the Bush Administration to move forward with its own good idea.

Obama promised to pay more attention to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some of the policies he has proposed - like sending more U.S. troops, and launching attacks into Pakistan without the agreement of the Pakistani government - are of dubious merit and are likely to be harmful. But other things he has proposed, like increasing the pace and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, are urgently needed. Obama has argued, correctly, that the U.S. should talk to everyone. This policy needs to be applied in Afghanistan and Pakistan, without delay. The official policy of the Afghan government is to seek reconciliation with the Taliban. U.S. policy should clearly support this policy of the Afghan government, not seek to sabotage it.

Obama promised to actively support efforts for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Early indications that he seriously intends to do so could have a dramatic effect in the region. He could signal that he intends to actually implement existing U.S. policy against Israeli settlements in the West Bank, a policy with which the majority of Israelis would have no dispute, and would welcome with relief.

Obama promised to improve U.S. relations with Latin America. In a campaign speech, he invoked the example of FDR, whose “Good Neighbor” policy swore off U.S. military intervention, and pledged economic and humanitarian cooperation. Great strides could be easily made in Latin America through cooperation, extending education and health care to the poor majority in a region suffering from extreme poverty and inequality. Obama could start by negotiating the return of ambassadors with Bolivia and Venezuela, and reversing the Bush Administration’s decision to end Bolivia’s preferential access to the U.S. market. He could fulfill his promise to lift the Bush Administration’s restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba, work with the bipartisan Cuba Caucus in the House to make it easier for U.S. companies to sell to Cuba, and work towards lifting completely the U.S. embargo, which the whole world is demanding. He could pledge that the U.S. will, for once, remain studiously neutral in the upcoming Salvadoran elections.

Obama promised to cut unnecessary spending. The greatest opportunity for cuts is in the military budget, which is outrageously large by world standards, and much of which consists of pork barrel spending for military contractors. Representative Frank has called for a 25% cut in U.S. military spending. Let John McCain, who says he know where to cut, prepare a list of recommendations. Who will dare to say that John McCain’s proposed cuts cannot be made?

It’s always to early, until it’s too late. Urge Barack now to reform U.S. foreign policy.

http://www.justforeignpolicy.org/involved/askBarack.html

On Invasion Anniversary, British Govt Says: Talk to Taliban
Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, October 7, 2008

October 7 marks the seventh anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. To mark the occasion, the British government, our closest allies in Europe, are sending us a message on all channels: there is no military solution, there must be a political solution, and there should be talks with the Taliban. It would be a step forward for U.S. policy if both Presidential candidates would acknowledge this reality in tonight’s debate.

America is somewhat preoccupied at the moment with the economic crisis and the Presidential election. But the Brits are trying to get through to us anyway, perhaps because they fear that some of the rhetoric of the Presidential campaign risks locking the U.S. into a path of military escalation, when what is needed is a political escalation.

Over the weekend, the top British military commander in Afghanistan made a number of statements that have yet to penetrate US political discourse. The Guardian reports:

“We’re not going to win this war,” Brigadier Mark Carleton-Smith said yesterday. “It’s about reducing it to a manageable level of insurgency that’s not a strategic threat and can be managed by the Afghan army. We may well leave with there still being a low but steady ebb of rural insurgency.”

…

He said the aim should be to change the nature of the debate in Afghanistan so that disputes were settled by negotiation and not violence. “If the Taliban were prepared to sit on the other side of the table and talk about a political settlement, then that’s precisely the sort of progress that concludes insurgencies like this,” Carleton-Smith said. “That shouldn’t make people uncomfortable.”

The British government supported the commander’s statements, the Financial Times reports:

A spokesman said the UK’s ministry of defense “did not have a problem” with warning the UK public not to expect a “decisive military victory” and to prepare instead for a possible deal with the Taliban.

The top United Nations official in Afghanistan added his voice in support, Reuters reports:

“I’ve always said to those that talk about the military surge … what we need most of all is a political surge, more political energy,” Kai Eide, the U.N. special envoy to Afghanistan, told a news conference in Kabul. “We all know that we cannot win it militarily. It has to be won through political means. That means political engagement.”

Eide said success depended on speaking with all sides in the conflict. “If you want to have relevant results, you must speak to those who are relevant. If you want to have results that matter, you must speak to those who matter,” he said.

Indeed, talks between Taliban representatives and Afghan government officials took place recently in Saudi Arabia, CNN reports:

In a groundbreaking meeting, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia recently hosted talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban militant group, according to a source familiar with the talks. The historic four-day meeting took place during the last week of September in the Saudi city of Mecca, according to the source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the negotiations.

…

It was the first such meeting aimed at bringing a negotiated settlement to the Afghan conflict and for the first time, all parties were able to discuss their positions and objectives openly and transparently, the source said.

…

While Mullah Omar was not present at the talks in Mecca, the source said the Taliban leader has made it clear he is no longer allied with al Qaeda - a position that has never been publicly stated but emerged at the talks. It confirms what another source with an intimate knowledge of the Taliban and Mullah Omar has told CNN in the past.

Even Defense Secretary Gates made somewhat supportive remarks. AP reports:

Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Monday endorsed efforts to reach out to members of the Taliban or other militants in Afghanistan who may be considered reconcilable, much like what has happened in Iraq.

Of course, what is really at issue here is not whether there is a policy of bringing in low-level Taliban fighters who agree to renounce violence and support the government. That policy already exists. What is at issue is initiating a process to bring in people at a higher level, a process that might involve some political accommodation. Note that the shift in strategy in Iraq after 2006 that is now called a success involved precisely this shift - bringing in not just fighters, but leaders, and making accommodation not just for individuals, but for groups with political demands, e.g integration into the Iraqi army.

There will be a tendency to want to push off these unwelcome realities until after the election. But the downside danger is the candidates locking themselves - and us - into a policy of military escalation, which without a new political posture, is almost certainly doomed to fail. Then we’d have another round of increase in needless American and Afghan deaths before we would accommodate reality. Why not begin the process of accommodating reality now, and avoid the needless deaths?

Robert Naiman is Senior Policy Analyst at Just Foreign Policy.

We are, it seems, suffering from a national “Stockholm Syndrome” when it comes to asking basic questions about the relationship between the United States, Israel, and the Palestinians. We need to get over this. A “baby steps” strategy is in order.

This week, Jewish Voice for Peace and Just Foreign Policy are calling on Americans to urge Jim Lehrer to ask Obama and McCain a question about Israeli-Palestinian peace in Friday’s foreign policy debate. Specifically, we want Lehrer to ask the candidates what they will do to implement longstanding U.S. policy of opposition to Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

The U.S. government has long acknowledged - including in repeated statements by Secretary of State Rice, as recently as last month - that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are a key stumbling block to peace. The question is whether implementing this U.S. policy of opposition will be made a priority.

The New York Times noted last month that in the last year Israel had nearly doubled its settlement construction in the West Bank, in violation of its obligations under a U.S.-backed peace plan, citing Peace Now’s authoritative report.

Can the presidential candidates - at least - affirm existing U.S. policy of opposition to the settlements?

If you say that “nothing can be done,” because “the Israel Lobby is too powerful,” then you should send the “Israel Lobby” a bill for your services, because you are doing their bidding.

It is an objective fact that the “Israel Lobby” is not omnipotent. To say that it is all-powerful is a foolish lie. So far, for example, the “all-powerful” Israeli Lobby has been blocked by the peace movement from taking U.S. policy towards Iran in a much more aggressive direction.

That wasn’t just the “peace movement,” you could argue. It was the peace movement, plus the Europeans, plus the grown-ups at the State Department and the Pentagon.

Fine: I concede your point. That just makes my point: the “Israel Lobby” is not all powerful. It can dominate U.S. policy towards the Palestinians if there is no meaningful challenge - that’s obvious. What if there were a meaningful challenge?

What is needed is a sustained “baby steps” effort to introduce basic facts into the U.S. political system and keep them there. It is a fact that Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank is a systemic threat to any meaningful Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It is a fact that failure to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a fundamental source of instability in the Middle East. It is a fact that the Israeli settlement expansion movement is fundamentally a racist movement, that most Americans would not want U.S. policy to support. (Even Israeli Prime Minister Olmert referred to a recent settler rampage against Palestinian civilians as a “pogrom,” the Jewish Daily Forward reports.)

Here is a baby step: urge Jim Lehrer to ask the Presidential candidates what they will specifically do to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace and end the policy of Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied Palestinian territories.

McCain Hypes the “Threat” from Iran
Robert Naiman, Just Foreign Policy, August 29, 2008

It may be Russia that recently sent its troops across international borders in violation of the UN Charter in a “humanitarian intervention” to protect the South Ossetians (can the Russians get Samantha Power to do PR for them about the “Responsibility to Protect”?), but Iran, apparently, remains the bogey of choice for McCain and the neocons, as indicated by McCain’s “tiny” ad. Apparently the neocons think Iran will work better to “scare the hell out of the American people,” in the phrase attributed to Senator Vandenberg. Russia has one big demerit as a neocon bogey: it has too much ability to defend itself. It has nuclear weapons, a veto on the UN Security Council, huge energy reserves, easy ability to be disruptive to U.S. plans across a range of fronts. As any bully knows, “pick on someone your own size” is not advice generally followed by the successful bully. The most successful bullies will generally choose a bogey that has no reasonable prospect of significantly hurting them. And that points towards Iran.

Does Iran represent a “serious threat” to the United States of America, or even to Israel? It depends, certainly, on what you mean by “serious” and “threat.” It is, of course, in the interests of McCain and the neocons to conflate two very different kinds of “threats”: military threats and political challenges.

Iran, any honest and knowledgeable person would admit, does not represent, now or in the foreseeable future, a significant military threat to the United States or even to Israel. (If it did, Americans and Israelis should ask why we bother having such huge military budgets, and in the case of Israel, mandatory military service, if these things are so irrelevant.) Iran, as far as anyone outside knows, does not possess nuclear weapons, and is not in the process of acquiring any. The latter assertion in some sense cannot be proved: if Bush Administration officials are pushed, they will say that it doesn’t matter if Iran is currently seeking to acquire nuclear weapons in the normal sense of actually acquiring them, because they are acquiring the capacity to enrich uranium, and the capacity to enrich uranium is very useful for building nuclear weapons. If you define “seeking nuclear weapons” this way - seeking to develop a capacity which would have the effect of making it easier for you to acquire nuclear weapons in the future, should you wish to do so - then indeed, Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon. But according to this standard, Brazil and many other countries we are not threatening to attack are also “seeking nuclear weapons,” and there is no provision in any international law, treaty or agreement which would justify unilateral U.S. or Israeli action against Iran on the basis of this “threat.”

Even if Iran were to actually acquire a nuclear weapon - an extremely distant prospect made more likely by U.S. and Israeli threats - it’s far from obvious that this would make the United States or Israel less secure in a military sense. It would still be true, for the foreseeable future after that distant and unlikely prospect, that the United States and Israel would have an absolutely overwhelming military advantage against Iran in any military confrontation, and it would also be true that everyone would know that for Iran to use a nuclear weapon against Israel would be an act of suicide. And every honest and knowledgeable person admits that Iranian leaders, like leaders elsewhere, are overwhelmingly pragmatic and rational in their actions. They may make misjudgments, they may undertake provocative acts when they see it as being in their interests to do so, but like most people everywhere, they do not want to die, and they do not want to lose power.

The primary utility, from the Iranian point of view, of having a nuclear weapon would be that the United States and Israel would have to formally abandon the fantasy of attacking Iran. That, from the point of view of the neocons, is the “threat.” They don’t want Iran to become another Russia, a country that you can’t easily push around. (Of course, if the United States would respect international law and the UN Charter - as it demands of Russia - then the United States would have to concede this, even if the Iranians only had sticks and stones.)

And the reason they see this as a high priority is that they see Iran as a political threat. If you see yourself as bully of the schoolyard, the presence of other bullies who aren’t part of your gang is a latent threat. The next seemingly defenseless person you want to bully might turn to another bully for protection. And that’s a threat to your power.

But it’s far from obvious why the majority of the American people should see Iran in this way. The neocons were furious that Hizbollah was able to frustrate their plans to dominate Lebanon, in part because Hizbollah has patrons in the form of Iran and Syria. But what is the interest of the majority of Americans in dominating Lebanon? Arguably, the overwhelming majority of Lebanese, even those who have no love for Hizbollah, are far better off because the neocon project failed. A new national accord was reached in Lebanon, with the participation of all major factions, including Hizbollah and the US-backed coalition, and the support of all the regional patrons, including the Gulf countries, Iran, and Syria. An imperfect agreement, no doubt, but a far, far better outcome from the point of view of the interests of the majority of Lebanese than civil war.

The neocons are also furious that Iran has helped frustrate their fantasy to turn Iraq into a U.S. client state. This fantasy would almost surely have failed eventually, given its fundamental contradiction with Iraqi nationalism, even if Iran didn’t exist. But there’s no question that Iran has helped accelerate the failure of the neocon project for Iraq. So it’s understandable that the neocons are angry. But should we be angry? Is it in the interests of the majority of Americans to try to make Iraq into a U.S. client state? It’s certainly not in the interests of the U.S. soldiers who would have to be stationed there permanently, or their families, or American taxpayers who would have to foot the bill.

When the United States leaves Iraq, Iraq will not be a U.S. client state. Neither it be an Iranian client state, for the simple reason that this would not be in the interests of the majority of Iraqis, even the majority of Iraqi Shiites. It’s in the interests of the majority of Iraqis to have good relations with Iran, but it’s also in the interests of the majority of Iraqis to have good relations with Turkey and Jordan and the Gulf countries, and that means they have to balance the need for good relations with Iran with the need for good relations with others. And despite the last 30 years of national disaster, and the many real and deep conflicts that still have to be worked out, they still have an Iraqi national identity, and a strong desire to be free and independent actors in the world. No outside power, or coalition of outside powers, has the resources or stomach over the long-term to frustrate the desire of the majority of Iraqis to live in an independent country.

So if you’re a neocon, Iran is a significant threat, not in a military sense, but in a political sense. But from the standpoint of the interests of the majority of Americans, Iran is not a significant threat, because the majority of Americans have no stake in the neocon project of dominating the Middle East. The majority of Americans, and the majority of Israelis and other peoples in the Middle East, would be far better served by serious attempts to assist in resolving the conflicts of the Middle East. The continuation of neocon policies of military adventurism in the White House, in the form of John McCain, represents a far greater danger than Iran to Americans and the world.

[August 1, 2008]
Senator McCain, President Bush, and some of their oil industry friends are urging Americans to support overturning a 26-year ban on offshore drilling as a way to bring down gas prices. Of course, it’s snake oil designed for what the Joe Lieberman campaign affectionately called “low information voters.”

As Dean Baker and Nichole Szembrot of the Center for Economic and Policy Research noted in a June 2008 paper ,

the Energy Information Agency (EIA) projects that Senator McCain’s proposal would have no impact in the near-term since it will be close to a decade before the first oil can be extracted from the currently protected offshore areas. The EIA projects that production will reach 200,000 barrels a day (0.2 percent of projected world production) at peak production in close to twenty years. It describes this amount as too small to have any significant effect on oil prices.

In contrast, if the United States had continued raising auto fuel efficiency standards annually between 1985-2005 by a quarter of the amount it raised them annually from 1980-1985 — instead of leaving them virtually unchanged — the result would have roughly been the equivalent of 3.3 million barrels of oil per day in new production in 2008 — 16 times the impact of McCain’s Offshore Drilling [MOD], CEPR reports.

What about the impact of lifting sanctions on Iran?

“Sanctions are pushing up the cost of oil,” notes Juan Cole in a recent piece on Salon.
I asked Cole what his estimate of the scale of this effect was. If Iran could have expanded production of oil from 4 million barrels a day in the late 1990s to 6 million barrels a day today, that would be an extra 2 million barrels a day, i.e. 88 million barrels a day globally instead of 86, Cole says.

I asked Dean Baker of CEPR what could be the impact of lifting sanctions on Iran, and he wrote:

“Suppose they open up to foreign investment and production goes up 1-2 million barrels a day after a few years…It’s 5 to 10 times McCain’s offshore drilling.”

So, summarizing in a table, using MOD [”McCain’s Offshore Drilling”] as our “numeraire,” as the economists say, we have the following:

Modest Conservation: 16 MOD
Lift Sanctions on Iran: 5-10 MOD
McCain’s Offshore Drilling: 1 MOD

Now, some would surely argue that simply lifting sanctions on Iran is not politically feasible, because there is currently a “Washington Consensus” for sanctions on Iran supported by groups like AIPAC, linked to its nuclear program, relations with Iraq, Hamas, Hizbollah, etc.

Let’s concede for the sake of discussion that that is true. What about the lifting of sanctions in the context of a real, negotiated deal with Iran? Would such a deal be more likely if Americans realized that the likely effect of such a deal would include an increase in world oil production roughly equivalent to 5-10 MODs?

Consider the following.

First, insofar as the sanctions were aimed at stopping Iran from having a nuclear program, or having relations with Iraq, Hamas, or Hizbollah that the US doesn’t like, they have obviously not achieved their goals. If sanctions are expanded, (for example, by trying to ban Iran’s gas imports, through what effectively amounts to an international blockade, as AIPAC has proposed) then they will drive up the price of oil still further, and it seems unlikely that the U.S. will be able to get Russia and China and Germany to agree to expand the sanctions to the degree necessary to achieve any of those goals.

Second, a key reason that the U.S. can’t win support for the effective expansion of sanctions is that current U.S. policies are based on goals that are not widely seen internationally as legitimate. It’s one thing to say you don’t want Iran to have nuclear weapons. For that goal there is widespread international support (including — according to their repeated public statements — all the leaders of Iran, and the majority of Iranian public opinion.) But the current U.S. goal is to prevent Iran from having any nuclear program at all that involves the enrichment of uranium, and that goal has weak international support.

Suppose the U.S. changed its goals with respect to Iran to make them more realistic. Suppose, for example, that instead of trying to ban enrichment of uranium in Iran entirely — a nonstarter for the overwhelming majority of Iranian public opinion — the US were to seek to put Iran’s uranium enrichment program under full international control, as Ambassador Pickering has proposed.

Suppose that instead of the unrealistic goals of demanding that Iran not “support” allies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, the US sought Iran’s agreement to support its allies only politically and financially, and for Iran to use its influence with its allies to diminish violence and promote national reconciliation in these countries, as Iran has offered to do in the past and indeed has already done in Iraq and Lebanon. Suppose that, as seems quite plausible, as a result of this shift in U.S. policy the U.S. was able to get a deal with Iran, and lift the sanctions.

Should not the fact that such a policy could bring the benefit of 5-10 MODs be part of our debate over policy towards Iran? Would Americans tolerate that AIPAC dictate US policy towards Iran if they realized that it was costing them every time they went to the pump?

Here’s a first step: don’t let AIPAC drive up gas prices even more. Ask Congress to reject AIPAC’s resolution seeking to ban Iran’s gas imports.

Ambassador Pickering calls for talks with Iran without preconditions and advocates for a multinational uranium enrichment consortium in Iran.

Is Israel really preparing to attack Iran? The New York Times today describes a June Israeli military exercise U.S. officials say “appeared to be a rehearsal for a potential bombing attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.” A “senior Pentagon official” said a goal of the exercise “was to send a clear message to the United States” and Europe that Israel was prepared to act militarily if U.S. pressure to stop Iran from enriching uranium continued to fail.

If so, retired Air Force Colonel Sam Gardiner didn’t get the message. “The signal I received is that Israel does NOT have the capability to effectively attack Iran’s nuclear facilities,” Col. Gardiner says.

Gardiner says a 2006 MIT paper by Whitney Raas and Austin Long, “Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities,” is a good representation of how Israeli military planners think about targeting.

According to Raas and Long, in a strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities Israel would be interested in three targets - the enrichment facility at Natanz, the conversion facility at Esfahan and the heavy water plant at Arak. They say Israel would want to attack these three facilities with a combined total of 36 aircraft.

“Getting 36 bombing aircraft into the targets connects well with the New York Times description of the early June exercise of 100 aircraft,” Gardiner says. “Three strike packages of F-15I and F-16I aircraft, escorted by F-15A/C’s with other supporting aircraft would be around 100 aircraft.”

“An Israeli strike would not be much of a strike,” Gardiner says. Israel would hit approximately 100 aim points, single weapons on a single part of the target. “I would call the Israeli strike ‘disruptive’ rather than ‘destructive,’” he says. It has taken three to five years to build the three facilities. “You would have to destroy most of the facilities to come close to setting back the program three to five years.”

The US probably thinks in terms of about 10 times more aim points for a similar strike, Gardiner notes.

“President Bush likes beehive analogies,” Gardiner points out. ” An Israel-only strike would stir up the bees and leave the hives with only limited damage.”

If Gardiner’s analysis is correct, then Michael Gordon’s New York Times article is deceptive, perhaps deliberately so. It’s part of a campaign of pressure on Congress and European governments - likely orchestrated with the Cheney faction of the Bush Administration - to forego real negotiations with Iran, and to push towards U.S. military escalation. If we don’t act, the Israelis will, the argument will be - neglecting the fact that no Israeli action is possible without a green light from Washington.

Next week, Congress may consider on its suspension calendar a resolution promoted by AIPAC that effectively endorses a naval blockade against Iran - an act of war. If you don’t think such a resolution should be rushed through Congress, you can say so here.

by Robert Naiman

When Representative Dennis Kucinich introduced articles of impeachment against Vice-President Cheney, and then against President Bush, one of his key accusations was that the Bush Administration has tried to lead the United States into war with Iran.

So you might have thought that Members of Congress who signed on to the impeachment crusade shared Rep. Kucinich’s critique of U.S. saber-rattling towards Iran.

If you thought that, you might want to think again. The evidence is, shall we say, mixed.

Representative Robert Wexler, who has made support of impeachment a signature issue, has signed on to a House resolution promoted by AIPAC that appears to endorse a naval blockade of Iran. A naval blockade would, of course, be an act of war. If not sanctioned by the UN Security Council - and there is no reason to believe that it would be - it would be a war crime. The resolution makes no mention of seeking Security Council approval.

Consider what House Concurrent Resolution 362 “demands”:

that the President initiate an international effort to immediately and dramatically increase the economic, political, and diplomatic pressure on Iran to verifiably suspend its nuclear enrichment activities by, inter alia, prohibiting the export to Iran of all refined petroleum products; imposing stringent inspection requirements on all persons, vehicles, ships, planes, trains, and cargo entering or departing Iran; and prohibiting the international movement of all Iranian officials not involved in negotiating the suspension of Iran’s nuclear program;

And consider how the United States and its allies could prohibit “the export to Iran of all refined petroleum products” or “impose stringent inspection requirements on all persons, vehicles, ships, planes, trains, and cargo entering or departing Iran” without imposing a naval blockade, an act of war.

If you think that’s a far-fetched interpretation, consider what the New York Times reported Sunday as the possible consequence if Iran refused the “generous offer” to comply with U.S. demands that it stop enriching uranium:

“other punitive moves against Iran that could be taken by a ‘coalition of the willing’ outside the United Nations”

“Outside the United Nations” meaning, presumably, without UN Security Council authorization. And what might those “punitive moves” be?

“Officials would not provide details, but analysts suggest those could include a naval embargo of the Persian Gulf or the refusal to supply Western-made technology required for Iran’s oil industry, creating bottlenecks in Iran’s oil production.”

I’m a firm believer in giving people the benefit of the doubt, and I would not be surprised if Rep. Wexler signed on to this “get tough” resolution without thinking through its implications.

If so, all Rep. Wexler has to do to set things straight is remove his name from the resolution.

You can check whether he has done so here.

A House leadership office said that the resolution could be put on the suspension calendar next week.

If you think that would be bad, you can write Congress in opposition to this resolution here.

by Robert Naiman

Who says America doesn’t have a free press?

Everything you know about the world will be reported by the New York Times - eventually.

You just have to be very patient - and read very carefully.

On Sunday, the New York Times reported that President Bush “accused” Iran of rejecting a new set of incentives to stop enriching uranium. “I am disappointed that the leaders rejected this generous offer out of hand,” Bush said.

Of course, Iran didn’t reject it “out of hand,” as the article goes on to explain:

Tehran did not formally reject the offer…Mr. Mottaki [Iran’s Foreign Minister] said that Iran’s response would depend on how the West responded to Iran’s May 13 proposal calling for international talks on all issues and improved international inspection of Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Nor was it true that President Bush was disappointed:

The French and Americans presumed in advance that their new proposal of incentives … would be brushed aside by Tehran, officials and diplomats said, insisting on anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.

[Presumably, “sensitivity of the issue” means “because they are not supposed to be quoted on the record saying that the ‘diplomatic’ initiative is a charade.”]

So, in the space of thirteen words, President Bush managed to lie (at least) twice.

Was it a “generous offer”? That of course is a matter of perspective. Iran is being offered a package of economic incentives to give up what Iranians - not just the government, but Iranians generally - regard as a fundamental right - mastery of the technology to enrich uranium. As Iran’s UN Ambassador told the Boston Globe on May 31, “This has become an issue of national pride.” As the NYT notes, the same deal was offered in the past, and Iran rejected it.

Regardless of whether anyone in Washington agrees that Iran has the right to enrich uranium, it is an objective fact that Iranians generally, not just the government, believe that Iran has the right to enrich uranium.

In April, the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland published a poll of Iranian public opinion. PIPA found that 81% of Iranians consider it “very important” for “Iran to have a full-fuel-cycle nuclear program” which would give Iran the capacity to produce nuclear fuel for energy production. Four out of five. Only 5% think Iran should not pursue a full-fuel-cycle program.

So, the United States and its allies made a proposal for to Iran to give up something that four out of five Iranians consider to be “very important.” The United States and its allies expected Iran to reject the “offer,” as it has in the past.

Why the charade? The NYT explains:

But Mr. Bush and the Europeans who formally made the offer want to show that all efforts at dialogue are being taken.

So, “all efforts at dialogue” means restating a proposal that the government of Iran has already rejected - and which Iran is expected, by those making the proposal, to reject again - to give up something that four in five Iranians say is “very important.”

Who is the audience for this “show”? People who don’t read the New York Times, apparently. These people will be told that “all efforts at dialogue” have been exhausted and there is no alternative to “other punitive moves against Iran that could be taken by a ‘coalition of the willing’ outside the United Nations”:

“Officials would not provide details, but analysts suggest those could include a naval embargo of the Persian Gulf or the refusal to supply Western-made technology required for Iran’s oil industry, creating bottlenecks in Iran’s oil production.”

For those scoring at home, a naval embargo would be an act of war. If undertaken “outside the United Nations” - i.e. without the authorization of the UN Security Council - it would be a war crime. If you don’t think Iran would retaliate for this act of war, or that it doesn’t have effective means of doing so, then you are, as John McCain might say, “naïve and inexperienced.”

Once again a false choice is placed before the world - the fake diplomacy of the Bush Administration or war. Are there no other alternatives?

The same PIPA poll found that 58% of Iranians support the idea of making a deal with the UN Security Council that would allow Iran to have a full-cycle nuclear program while giving the International Atomic Energy Agency “permanent and full access throughout Iran to ensure that its nuclear program is limited to energy production” and not producing nuclear weapons. PIPA notes that in a March 2008 poll for the BBC World Service 55% of Americans approved of such a deal.

Indeed, in its May 13 proposal - which the NYT dismisses in a phrase by noting that it “does not mention the key Western demand - that Iran stop enriching uranium,” Iran proposed “international talks on all issues and improved international inspection of Iran’s nuclear facilities.”

Furthermore, as the Boston Globe reported May 31, Iran’s UN Ambassador said Iran “would consider establishing an internationally owned consortium inside Iran that could produce nuclear fuel with Iranian participation.”

As the Boston Globe noted on June 10, “Thomas Pickering, the US ambassador to the United Nations under President George H.W. Bush, endorsed the idea of such a consortium in a March article in the New York Review of Books.” And the plan is “getting increased interest from senior members of both parties in Congress and nonproliferation specialists”:

Senators Dianne Feinstein, a California Democrat, and Chuck Hagel, a Nebraska Republican, have said publicly that the plan should be explored.

Representative Edward J. Markey, a Malden Democrat, went further, calling the plan “a creative, thoughtful, and productive potential solution.”

And Joseph Cirincione, a “nonproliferation specialist who serves informally as an adviser to Obama’s campaign,” says the idea is “worth exploring.”

So there is an alternative. But you wouldn’t know it from the “show.”

If you think Congress should be pressing for real diplomacy with Iran, you can ask them to do so here.

by Robert Naiman

Where are America’s “million Trotskyites” when you need them?

When Iran’ UN Ambassador told the Boston Globe that Iran would “consider establishing an internationally owned consortium inside Iran that could produce nuclear fuel with Iranian participation” - a proposal advocated by such impeccably credentialed members of the US foreign policy establishment as former US Ambassador to Israel Thomas Pickering - America’s Trotskyite press could have had a field day.

“The Revolution Betrayed,” their headlines could have blared. “Iran Accepts Bush Administration Premise It Has Fewer Rights Than Brazil.”

Some accuse the Bush Administration of having a double standard on Iran’s nuclear program. But this is misleading. It’s really a triple standard. Moreover, Iran has, in principle, accepted the operation of a triple standard.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is premised on a double standard. There’s one set of commitments for the nuclear powers - like the United States - and another set of commitments for the non-nuclear powers, like Iran.

Then there’s the “actually existing” Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT “as observed.” In the NPT “as observed,” the nuclear powers don’t actually have to do anything, except mumble the word “disarmament” under their breath occasionally, with their fingers crossed behind their backs, while trying not to laugh. The non-nuclear powers, of course, have actual commitments that they are expected to comply with.

What the Bush Administration has been arguing for is a triple standard: one standard for the nuclear powers, one standard for the non-nuclear powers, and a third standard for a group of countries which may be defined as follows: “Iran, so long as it has a government that we don’t like.”

The Bush Administration argues that because Iran was not transparent about its nuclear program in the past, it has forfeited its right to enrich uranium for a peaceful nuclear program under the NPT, like Brazil.

And Iran, if it accepts the Pickering proposal, is accepting the premise that it should have fewer rights than Brazil. Iran is not, if it accepts the Pickering proposal, contesting the operation of a triple standard. It’s simply contesting what the triple standard should be - advocating that the triple standard be international control of an enrichment program on Iranian soil, rather than no enrichment program on Iranian soil at all.

But the Bush Administration refuses to acknowledge that there is a serious Iranian proposal on the table - or that the proposal has supporters among America’s foreign policy elite - because according to the Bush Administration the standoff is over whether there can be any enrichment in Iran at all, under any circumstances, ever, so long as Iran has a government that the US doesn’t like. So any proposal that countenances enrichment on Iranian soil, is by the Bush Administration’s definition, not serious.

This might seem to some like an insider policy debate. But Americans have a big stake in changing the current US policy. Because of the Bush Administration’s current policy, the United States and Iran stand at the precipice of war. Because of the Bush Administration’s current policy, the United States and Iran cannot cooperate to help bring peace to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. If there were political settlements to the violent conflicts in these countries, which Iran could help facilitate and enforce, U.S. soldiers who are currently on track to die in these conflicts could instead come home and rejoin their families.

Of course, the Bush Administration places a higher value on enforcing its dogma about Iran’s nuclear program than it does on the lives of U.S. soldiers.

But what about us?

by Robert Naiman

Among American newspapers, only the Boston Globe, apparently, thinks its readers might be interested to know that there is a proposal on the table that could bridge the gap between Iran’s insistence on its right to enrich uranium on Iranian soil and international concern that Iran’s enrichment program would increase the capacity of Iran to develop nuclear weapons in the future.

On the Globe’s website, the article is filed under “education.” Apparently, if you live in the Boston area, you get to learn about this not because a deal could prevent war between the United States and Iran, not because this proposal suggests that, contrary to the claims of the Bush Administration and Senator McCain, it might be possible to draw an enforceable line between Iran having an enrichment program and Iran having a nuclear weapons program, but because several people who have worked on the proposal are on the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Perhaps the MIT folks could expand their team to universities in New York and Washington, so that Americans outside of the Boston area may read about it.

The Globe’s Farah Stockman reported yesterday:

A deeply controversial plan put forth by MIT scientists to end the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program is getting increased interest from senior members of both parties in Congress and nonproliferation specialists.

The plan, which was rejected three years ago by the Bush administration, argues for a dramatic shift in US policy: Rather than trying to halt Iran’s efforts to enrich uranium, the United States should help build an internationally run enrichment facility inside Iran to replace Iran’s current facilities.

Supporters argue that such a program would fulfill Iran’s insistence on enriching uranium on its own soil, while preventing the dangerous material from being diverted to weapons.

Iran has expressed interest in the proposal, the Globe reports:

Iranian officials proposed building an international enrichment plant inside Iran in a letter they submitted to the United Nations last month, but declined to say whether such a plant would be in addition to or a replacement for their own facilities.

In an interview last month, Iran’s ambassador to the UN, Mohammad Khazaee, said the details should be negotiated.

Senior Members of Congress have expressed interest:

Senators Dianne Feinstein, a California Democrat, and Chuck Hagel, a Nebraska Republican, have said publicly that the plan should be explored.

Representative Edward J. Markey, a Malden Democrat, went further, calling the plan “a creative, thoughtful, and productive potential solution.”

An “informal adviser” to the Obama campaign “did not rule the option out”:

Presidential candidates John McCain, the presumptive GOP nominee, and Barack Obama, the presumptive Democratic nominee, have both endorsed using international consortiums to produce nuclear fuel as a way to take production out of the hands of unpredictable states, but neither has said he would consider placing such a facility inside Iran. McCain’s campaign said an Iran-based plant would not be “subject to transparent and accountable international safeguards.” But advisers to Obama did not rule the option out.

“This is nobody’s first choice, but it may be the compromise we end up with,” said Joseph Cirincione, a nonproliferation specialist who serves informally as an adviser to Obama’s campaign. Cirincione is president of the Ploughshares Fund, a nonproliferation organization based in San Francisco that provided funding for talks that Pickering and his associates held with Iranian officials.

When will the readers of the New York Times and the Washington Post get to learn about this? Years from now, when it can be acknowledged as a “missed opportunity” for U.S. diplomacy?

At the National Conference on Media Reform, Janine Jackson of FAIR was asked about challenging the media’s failure to report. It’s hard to do media criticism, she said, where there is nothing to criticize. The reporting of one outlet can be used to criticize the others.

So ask away, media critics: how come readers of the Boston Globe get to know about this, but not readers of the New York Times or the Washington Post?